From a military standpoint, there's no comparison between the United States and even a gang of third-world nations. The same is not true, however, in respect to information warfare.

In March 1997, a Swedish cracker penetrated and disabled a 911 system in Florida. Eleven counties were affected. The cracker amused himself by connecting 911 operators to one another (or simply denying service altogether).

The Swedish case was not the first instance of crackers disrupting 911 service. In Chesterfield, New Jersey, a group dubbed the Legion of Doom was charged with similar crimes. What was their motivation? "[T]o attempt to penetrate 911 computer systems and infect them with viruses to cause havoc."

Another disturbing case occurred in March 1997, when a Rutland, Massachusetts, teenager cracked an airport. During the attack, the airport control tower and communication facilities were disabled for six hours. (The airport fire department was also disabled.) It was reported as follows:

"Public health and safety were threatened by the outage which resulted in the loss of tele phone service, until approximately 3:30 p.m., to the Federal Aviation Administration Tower at the Worcester Airport, to the Worcester Airport Fire Department, and to other related concerns such as airport security, the weather service, and various private airfreight companies. Further, as a result of the outage, both the main radio transmitter, which is connected to the tower by the loop carrier system, and a circuit which enables aircraft to send an electric signal to activate the runway lights on approach were not operational for this same period of time." —Transport News, March 1998.

The introduction of advanced minicomputers has forever changed the balance of power. The average Pentium and Alpha processors are more powerful than many mainframes were five years ago. Add to this advances in Linux clustering and distributed processing solutions, and with relatively cheap hardware you can start approaching the processing power that was previously only known by a few government and research institutes.

A third-world nation could theoretically pose a threat to our national information infrastructure. Using advanced microcomputers (and some high-speed connections), a third-world nation could wage a successful information warfare campaign against the United States at costs well within its means. In fact, bona fide cyberterrorism will probably emerge in the next few years.

Furthermore, the mere availability of such advanced technology threatens our military future in the "real" world. Nations such as Russia and China have progressed slowly because they lacked access to such technology. Their missiles are less accurate because their technology base was less advanced. U.S. defense programs, however, were sufficiently advanced that even when we appeared to make concessions in the arms race, we really made no concessions at all. Here's an example: The United States only agreed to quit nuclear tests after we developed the technology to perform such tests using computer modeling.

As the United States'perceived enemies obtain more sophisticated computer technology, their weapons will become more sophisticated—but it's not simply weapons that make the difference. It's the combination of weapons, communication, and information. If our enemies can alter our information, or prevent us from accessing it, they can gain a tremendous tactical military advantage. This could make up for shortcomings in other areas. Shane D. Deichman reports the following in his paper "On Information War:"

A key element of the information warfare environment is the participants need not possess superpower status. Any power (even those not considered nation-states) with a modicum of technology can disrupt fragile C2 networks and deny critical information services. Rather than a Mahanian "information control" strategy that attempts to dominate all segments of the information spectrum, though, a more realistic strategy for U.S. forces is one of "information denial" (that is, the denial of access to truthful information).

Perhaps a question less asked, however, is, should the U.S. government be responsible for protecting all of the U.S. infrastructure? After all, aren't the companies that operate systems like our telephone networks FOR PROFIT? Shouldn't the protection of these systems be one of their primary concerns?

You'd think so, wouldn't you? Although the U.S. government has more then its fair share of problems and tasks, organizations turning to the government to make their information security problems go away are missing the point. Information security is everyone's problem—welcome to the party.